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Abstract. The present article discusses sign typology from the perspective of 
action which is conceived as having a sextet structure. The relation between means 
and purpose in action is analogous to the relation between sign and meaning. The 
greater the degree in which the action has purpose, the less tool-like the action is. 
Peirce’s trichotomies correspond to a fragment of the sextet structure.  
 
 
It is a common knowledge in contemporary Peircean semiotics that 
sign processes, or semioses, are due to signs’ acting1. In this paper we 
take the word ‘action’ seriously, proceeding from the paradigm of 
integral human action, and seek for the substantial basis of the sign 
phenomena in the framework of action.       
                                                 
1   One of those who love to stress that is John Deely (e.g., Deely 1990: 11; Deely 
2005: 26; Deely 2008).  In a similar sense the word ‘action’ is used in Peirce’s text 
‘Pragmatism’ (1998 [1907]: 411). To contrast semiosis (often named ‘sign-action’) 
to the ordinary ‘action of brute force’ he writes: “But by ‘semiosis’ I mean, on the 
contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a coöperation of three 
subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence 
not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs” (Peirce 1998 [1907]: 
411). We will use the word ‘action’ in a different sense, having in view a direct 
analogy with human action.     
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In our earlier publications we introduced the method of sextets, 
particularly for classification processes in semiotics2. Here the same 
framework is reintroduced for the analysis of action in order to throw 
more light on signs.    
 
 
Typology of action 
 
We proceed from the idea that the structure of action is constituted by 
variants of “proportion” of means and purpose3. That is, we conceive 
that action occurs synchronically on levels differing in how strongly 
purposeful the action on that particular level is. Besides, action grows 
towards perfection going through different stages, becoming more and 
more purposeful. Purpose in action is conceived to have a role 
analogous to the role of meaning4 in sign processes. This throws new 
light on the concept of sign.    
Let us take a closer look. Commonly action is conceived to 
combine a technical aspect and a purposeful, or alternatively put, 
meaningful aspect. The purpose gives meaning to the means. In the 
most familiar and common case we choose means in order to achieve 
some goal. To have a goal, we need to be oriented in the world by 
means of some model or picture. However, that model is a substitute 
for the world rather than a means in the sense we imply here. The 
model is where we specify and describe our goal, that is, the state of 
affairs we are striving for. We also project our actions into the world, 
knowing (or imagining) their causal effects.  
                                                 
2   For the last version of the method of sextets see Luure 2008.  
3   In Luure 2008, types of signs are analogously conceived according to the 
relations between two items called ‘sign’ and ‘meaning’. The differences between 
the types of those relations can be characterized as differences of proportion of 
‘sign’ and ‘meaning’. Where there is relatively more meaning there the sign is 
more meaningful.    
4   ‘Meaning’ is meant to be an umbrella concept for different semiotic relations. 
Intuitively, ‘meaning’ is what is both revealed and covered by the ‘sign’ and 
renders the ‘sign’ ‘meaningful’.  
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Now, in order to really act, we need skills, that is, something we 
can implement without thinking them through. Our deliberate choices 
are reduced to choices between skills to be implemented. Those skills 
constitute the technical aspect of our actions. For example, when I go 
somewhere by foot then the place of destination, and occasionally the 
route, are goals (or maybe I change my mind halfway); what is my 
means is the walking skill itself with its variants, like different speeds 
and directions. Or, to take a linguistic example, in speaking my means 
are the vocabulary and the grammar of the language (which I master5) 
and the goal of talking is to convey a particular message. To this end, I 
compose a sentence out of words. 
Let us extend this common conception. I take it that the whole of 
actions consists of levels, each having its own type of purpose, or in 
other words, its own way how means and purpose relate to each other. 
In the above example, in skills the means and purpose appear to be 
indistinguishable: exercising a skill is just exercising a skill. In contrast, 
in striving for a goal the means and the purpose seem to be sharply 
contrasted. We also can put it that exercising a skill appears to have a 
meaning in itself, whereas in striving for a goal the same exercising has 
its meaning in the goal. In other words, just exercising a skill is 
another level of action with its own purpose and its own meaning, 
contrasting with the purpose and the meaning related to the goal. We 
are going to list the levels of action with the help of an example.  
In our example the common theme is need for light. In this context, 
action is presented as a process leading to the satisfaction of the need6. 
First of all we should ask ourselves how far could the difference of the 
above two levels be extended. We can see that just exercising a skill has, 
as it were, less meaning than striving for a goal but, on the other hand, 
                                                 
5   Vocabulary and grammar are embodied in my technical language skills, and 
so it is my skills that should be called my means. On the other hand, they are tools, 
and in this capacity they do something instead of myself, substituting for myself.   
6  It might seem that a need is basically the same as a goal. We are showing the 
growing depth of the way of satisfying the need: the goal only emerges in this 
process and the need turns out to be irreducible to goals. Thus, different levels of 
needs are revealed that are equivalent to the levels of action and levels of purpose.    
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its meaning is closer to the very action. We are going to extend the 
scale in the same terms. 
 
Level One. Zero action. So we are to seek for the most meaningless 
action which at the same time has the meaning closest to the very 
action. This should be zero action where no proper action is left, just 
being.  
Zero action corresponds to the situation where it is granted that 
the need is met. When light is granted, one need not undertake any-
thing. Moreover, this situation embodies lack of need: the need is no 
need here. Light as the “object” of need is not distinguished from the 
agent and its action.  
This type of action is the minimum type of action and the back-
ground of any action as its lowest level and ultimate tool. All other 
levels and types of action are built upon this zero action. Any action is 
ultimately realized by zero action. 
It is in itself meaningless and purposeless as it is indifferent to any 
meaning or purpose since these could be whatever, the action 
remaining the same. On the other hand, this zero action completely 
coincides with its purpose, taking to the absolute the apparent coinci-
dence with the purpose in the case of exercising a skill. The agent 
coincides with its tool.  
 
Level Two. Tracking action. Imagine now that an agent is looking for 
light, simply following the gradient of light brightness or in some 
other way following (or imitating) its environment. If that is it, the 
agent does not know what it is doing; it is just following. The meaning 
is placed in what is followed. 
Another, more general example of tracking action is imitating 
another agent. Indeed, even the realization of the physical laws of 
nature could be conceived of as tracking action. This is because the 
substrate of the laws (the ‘matter’) continues its existence by tracking 
itself  according to the laws. This tracking is the way it exists. In 
contrast, any particular state to be changed can be conceived as zero 
action. So, the laws represent the character of a level two agent.  
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Tracking action is like the continuous existence of an agent that 
perishes when the tracking stops. When tracking is resumed, it is the 
birth of another level two agent. For biological agents, tracking action 
is not the highest level of action and the identity of the agent depends 
on a higher level. Tracking is realized by some ‘subagent’ (tool). 
Tracking action presupposes zero action as its background. 
Tracking action can be conceived as an ‘ideal’ zero action with a 
‘changing’ identity.  
 
Level Three. Functional action. This third type of action is what above 
was called exercising a skill. This is a procedure or a tool, which has a 
function in a framework of functions. It functions like people in 
language games (Wittgenstein 1953) or animals in their Umwelten 
(Uexküll 1957).  
When I need light I might possess a special light organ or a special 
tool (called lamp). This organ or tool has a function and its action is of 
the third type. Though it might seem that the tools appear only now, it 
is just the functional character of the tool that emerges. It is important 
to see that the tool as an agent is less tool-like (more independent) 
than the agent of the second type, let alone the agent of the first type. 
This is because tools of higher types themselves possess more purpose 
(and meaning).7  
Tracking actions are involved as ‘subactions’ in the functional 
action. Functional action can be conceived of as an ‘ideal’ tracking 
action where the ‘ideal’ prototype of function is tracked.     
 
Level Four. Goal-oriented action. The fourth type of action is goal-
oriented. Above we called it striving for a tool.  
It is also possible to delegate this to a tool. For example, I can 
describe the light conditions I want and to make an automatic 
feedback-based tool to take care of these conditions.  
Functional actions are involved as subactions in the goal-oriented 
action. Goal-oriented actions can be conceived of as ‘external’ 
                                                 
7   Emmeche (2002) tried to tie the sign character of the living with functions.  
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functional actions where the ‘function’ is defined in terms of an ideal 
state. 
 
Level Five. Action proper. The fifth type of action is exemplified by the 
situation where I cannot exhaustively describe what kind of light I 
want. Then I have to confront myself in action with the very real world 
rather than my models of it. Even in this situation, someone might act 
as my “tool” and “servant” and understand what I really want. Here 
there is especially much of purpose (meaning) but it is especially far 
from the action. The action is on the limit of understanding, therefore 
substantially independent of it and belonging to the real world. There 
are no particular patterns to be acquired.  
Goal-oriented actions are involved as subactions in the action 
proper. Action proper can be conceived of as goal-oriented action with 
an indescribable goal.  
 
Level Six. Result action. The sixth type of action is related to what I 
really need rather than want and believe to need. This is the most 
purposeful and most meaningful type of action. It transcends me such 
as I know myself. In this action I, still wanting light, may not get it as I 
really do not need it (for example, when I want light for reading I 
might need sleep). Imagining a tool (servant) performing such action, 
my servant has become my master.  
In contrast to the zero action, here we have the most meaningful 
action that at the same time has the meaning furthest from the very 
action.  
Unlike in the case of zero action, no determinate modification of 
the result action can take us closer to the satisfaction of our need. 
What is needed is absolutely different (independent) from the agent 
and the action. 
In contrast to the zero action, the meaning and the purpose are 
entirely embodied in the very action. On the other hand, its purpose 
remains entirely beyond the action, the action being absolutely a mere 
tool.  
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From the point of view of the result action, everything is as needed 
despite of and independently from one’s efforts to meet one’s needs. 
Those efforts are a part of everything’s being as needed, like anything 
else. Similarly to the zero action, it is granted that the needs are met, 
but now this is not due to either the unpretentiousness of the needs or 
the monotony of the environment but the utmost integration of the 
universe.  
Action proper is a subaction of the result action. Result action can 
be conceived of as the result of the action proper.  
 
These levels of action show a progression towards more universal 
action. The more universal is the action, the more complicated 
environment it meets. Each level can be conceived of as a particular 
strategy, and each strategy may be optimal in some circumstances. The 
overall evolution shifts the action’s focus (as if the ‘agent’s’ locus) 
more and more away from the physical substrate of the action and 
renders the action more and more integrated.        
 
 
Action and signs 
 
We propose that signs should be seen in the overall framework of 
action. Signs are not to be thought of as something emerging from 
‘natural’, non-semiosic processes or just somehow present everywhere. 
Signs are there as an aspect of action. It is action that should be 
presupposed in any talk of signs. As in the above example, the concept 
of action should be extended to involve all levels and types of action, 
including zero action. 
In the Peircean tradition, the sign is defined as a relation between 
the representamen, the object and the interpretant. This idea could be 
extended. As we associated meaning with purpose, action could be 
treated as a hexadic relation between six levels of action, resulting in a 
hexadic relation between meanings of different types. So we have a 
different, “vertical” sign relation that is directly related to action.  
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Peirce’s writings contain a similar idea though he does not as-
sociate it directly with sign relations. In his most well-known sign ty-
pology (Peirce 1998 [1903]), Peirce’s first trichotomy defines whether 
a sign “in itself is a mere quality” (qualisign), “is an actual existent” 
(sinsign), or “is a general law” (legisign). Peirce indicates that quali-
signs need to be embodied in sinsigns in order to function as signs. On 
the other hand, legisigns need to come in replicas that are sinsigns. 
There are two directions in which different types of signs hierarchical-
ly depend on each other.8 In sign processes, the first direction can be 
taken as going from means to purposes. The three types of sign listed 
here form a hierarchy that is analogous to the hierarchy of the third, 
fourth and fifth levels of action and the hierarchy of the same levels of 
speech. The qualisign, the sinsign and the legisign are exemplified by 
the meanings occurring on the corresponding levels of speech. So this 
trichotomy could be extended to a sextet covering the full scale of 
ontological options. 
It seems that sign processes and action processes have essentially 
the same six-level hierarchy that is exemplified particularly in the 
levels of speech9. This hierarchy is, as it were, world-encompassing, so 
that all hierarchies meet in the extremes. The two extremes are the 
underlying “meaningless”, “purposeless”, “lifeless” background and 
the overarching “all-meaningful”, “all-purposeful”, “all-lifeful”, “fore-
ground”.  
We propose two dimensions of sign relations. The ‘vertical’ dimen-
sion represents the sign relation as the structure of action. The ‘hori-
                                                 
8   See Peirce 1998 [1903]: 291. 
9   In short, the types of meaning (corresponding to the levels of speech) in 
speech are as follows: 1) the zero-degree meaning where there is no meaning 
outside the signs; 2) the repetitional meaning that depends on the possibility of 
repeating phrases and sentences on a purely phonological basis; 3) the categorial 
meaning that involves vocabulary and grammatical categories; 4) the referential 
meaning that involves the things the words stand for; 5) the poetical meaning that 
involves meanings realized with the indispensable help of language; and 6) the 
mystical meaning that involves what is totally inexpressible but nevertheless gets 
meant. (See Luure 2008: 497–500 for a longer presentation).      
Andres Luure  278
zontal’ dimension involves the semiosis with its triadic sign relation. 
Our hypothesis is that the sign relation can be extended to a hexadic 
relation as well. Peirce describes the sign as a relation between three 
things. Peirce’s trichotomy truncates the sextet structure, omitting the 
levels preceding the category (in the sense of the result of catego-
risation10) as a possibility. The first item in this sextet should be ‘pos-
sibility’ without any range, a ‘quality’ without any qualitative determi-
nation. The second item should be underway of categorisation, with-
out any fixed quality; qualities are there only in mutual comparison. 
The sixth item should be an entity the laws depend on.        
  
  
The threshold of life: when are tools alive? 
 
In this context it is interesting to consider the problem of the thres-
hold of life, which for most biosemioticians has been answered by Se-
beok’s Thesis (Kull, Emmeche, Favareau 2008: 42) according to which 
life and sign processes are coextensive. 
It seems that, in terms of our hierarchy of levels, the minimum of 
life is placed on the third level, the functional level. So the question 
arises how can living functional action be distinguished from non-
living functional action. It seems that the question of the semiotic 
threshold (and life threshold) is to be replaced with other questions, 
such as: when are tools alive?   
In any case, the whole of life as action is understandable only so far 
as we include its tools on all levels of its action.    
 
 
Evolution of signs 
 
Another problem is the origin of the sophisticated human signs in 
more primitive and more ‘natural’ signs. It seems that this is possible 
only in the integral framework of action where the meaning of the 
                                                 
10   See, e.g., Kull 2002. 
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lower levels is revealed by higher levels. The  ‘origin’ is the underlying 
character of the signs of lower levels: each next level somehow 
disconnects the continuity of evolution. This exemplifies the following 
dilemma: either the signs have always been there in their present full-
blown form but only potentially11 or new types of signs have emerged 
from the old ones but there is no proper continuity between them.  
Our approach seems to enable to unite the two horns. The whole of 
the action has always been there but the levels of action and the types 
of signs have revealed themselves gradually. Each level of action 
corresponds to a historical stage in which the purpose of the action is 
not revealed beyond the particular level. Any emerging level gives a 
new meaning to the previous ones.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the talk of sign’s action we introduced a new account: the subject of 
action is the ‘vertical’ sign relation as the whole of action rather than 
some item involved in that action. So the sign relation itself is action as 
well as the subject of action.   
It takes further research to specify how the hexadic structure of the 
‘vertical’ sign relation is replicated in the ‘horizontal’ sign relation and 
how the Peircean trichotomies can be extended to sextets. 
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Деятельность в знаках 
 
Типология знаков рассматривается в свете секстетовой структуры 
деятельности. Отношение средства и цели в деятельности анало-
гична отношению знака и значения. Чем в большей мере деятель-
ность наделена целью, тем менее она подобна деятельности, 
свойственной орудию. Пирсовы трихотомии соответствуют фраг-
менту секстетовой структуры.  
 
 
Tegevus märkides 
 
Märgitüpoloogiat vaadeldakse tegevuse sekstetistruktuuri valguses. Va-
hendi ja eesmärgi suhe tegevuses on analoogne märgi ja tähenduse suhtele. 
Mida suuremal määral on tegevusel eesmärki, seda vähem sarnaneb ta 
tööriistale omase tegevusega. Peirce’i trihhotoomiad vastavad ühele 
sekstetistruktuuri fragmendile. Tegevus on tegevustasandite vaheline suhe, 
mis ongi ühtlasi tegevuse “subjekt”.      
 
